The EU has a democratic deficit. There have been numerous proposed solutions and initiatives to solve this longstanding problem. These are outlined below.
Subsidiarity and the Role of National Parliaments:
For people who believe that national parliaments are the most democratic institutions, it makes sense to vest more power into them to make the EU more democratic. This way, national democracy would trickle down into the EU. Conversely, it places national values inside the EU.
Problem:
While national governments retain power in the Council, national parliaments lose their domestic legislative powers (of veto, amendment, discussion etc.). Competence is lost to the EU institutions.
This may lead to the gatekeeping of conferral since the EU can only do what is explicitly allowed by Treaties, which are first approved by national parliaments.
National parliaments have trouble holding their own governments to account for decisions made in Brussels.
Solution:
Subsidiarity (TFEU Art 5(3)): in areas of shared competence, if something ‘cannot be achieved on national level’ and ‘can better be achieved on EU level’, the EU can deal with it. Otherwise, it is up to the nation state.
Also see, principle of conferral and proportionality. [1]
Legal Control of Subsidiarity:
Member states can challenge EU law-making competence. (EG: PHILIP MORRIS [2]) However, the ECJ has never ruled in favour of national states, mostly favouring the EU.
Political Control of Subsidiarity – the Early Warning Mechanism:
Under the Early Warning Mechanism (EWM), national parliaments have 8 weeks to review a legislative proposal to determine whether or not the EU should be able to have competence in this area.
Each member state has 2 votes (one vote per chamber in bicameral systems) and can object to a proposal.
If 1/3 of national parliaments issue a ‘yellow card’, the Commission must review the proposal, but can maintain its position as long as it engages.
Only 3 ‘yellow cards’ have ever been issued, and only 1 led to the legislation being stopped from proceeding.
If ½ of national parliaments issue an ‘orange card’, the Commission can maintain its position but require the European Parliament and Council approval.
Reform Proposals:
Switching to a system of red cards and green cards, and introducing a European Senate (COSAC).
The high thresholds required are often the element that prohibit proposals from being overturned. This bar ought to be rethought.
Spitzenkandidaten (German: ‘leading candidate’):
The Spitzenkandidaten process indicates the process of the Commission President being indirectly elected by EU citizens through European Parliament elections.
Problem:
When citizens vote for elections, citizens vote knowing who the leader is of the party they are voting in (EG: voting in Boris Johnson, not just the Conservative Party).
The connection between national voting and European Parliament voting is often not clear for citizens. When they vote, citizens are voting primarily for their national Parliament.
Solution:
Rather than voting for national parties, voting based on European ideals would increase voter turnout in European Parliament elections and strengthen the perception of representation and accountability.
Current Position:
In 2014, the main parliamentary groupings in the European Parliament agreed that they would only allow the lead candidate of the biggest party in the European Parliament to be nominated as the Commission President.
Remember Article 17(7) TEU: ‘Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having held the appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for President of the Commission. This candidate shall be elected by the European Parliament by a majority of its component members.’
In 2019, this idea strengthened. However, the European Council rejected the European Parliament's power-grab and nominated someone (Ursula von der Leyen) who was from the same political group as the winning group in the European Parliament, but not the winner of the European Parliament elections.
Some criticism has come regarding the fact that the Commission is meant to be insulated from politics. Electing the Commission’s Presidency based on elections makes it inherently political and undermines the Commission’s main stance as an institution of experts.
Transnational Party Lists:
Proposals for transnational party lists involve separating national parties and European parties in European Parliament elections.
Problem:
The connection between national voting and European Parliament voting is not clear for citizens. When they vote, citizens are voting primarily for their national parliament.
Solution:
Creating a European Polity:
Replacing or supplementing national party lists.
Creating European constituencies.
European identity and public sphere.
Current Position:
Proposals have received opposition from member states due to a loss of control for national parties in the European Parliament. However, there has been continuous support from the European Parliament itself.
Recently, the Conference on the Future of the EU (CofEU) officially recommended transnational party lists. This has been supported by the Commission too (especially Ursula von der Leyen).
The European Parliament approved a proposal for 28 of the MEPs to be elected on transnational party lists to test and begin implementation of this change. Although this is unlikely to happen soon (since member states have a veto), it does put pressure on them to consider the change.
European Citizen Initiatives (ECI):
Citizens initiatives would give citizens the power to promote legislation themselves.
Problem:
Citizens are not involved enough in EU law.
Solution:
Article 11(4) TEU: ‘Not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of Member States may take the initiative of inviting the European Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties’
Current Position:
In reality, the threshold for Art 11(4) TEU is quite hard to achieve: only NGOs, the Church and Trade Unions have the level of international institutionalisation necessary to get the required signatures.
ECIs are subject to what the Commission chooses to do regarding the proposal once the threshold has been met. The Commission is not required to pursue the initiatives.
EG: anti-abortion initiatives have been ignored.
While the Commission seeks to maintain its monopoly on proposing legislation, some critics have argued that successful ECI’s should trigger a proposal automatically.
Treaty Reform:
49 proposals covering 326 measures for changing the EU have been given by the Conference on the Future of the EU (CofEU).
Current Position:
The Commission and European Parliament are in support of many of the proposals.
Resources:
References:
[1] Conferral: Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), Article 5(2); Proportionality: Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), Article 5(4) [2] EG: Case C-547/14 Philip Morris [2016]
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